

From Ghana to the World Stage
Kofi Annan: Personality and Decision Making
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In studying Kofi Annan's personality and its influence on his decision making, I begin with an examination of his early years that shaped the formation of his personality, beginning with the social and cultural context of his family growing up in Ghana around the time of Ghana's independence from colonial rule, and continuing through his adult personality formation.

Brief Biographical Overview

Kofi Annan was the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations, serving two five-year terms from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2006. Born in Kumasi, Ghana in 1938, he was the first Secretary-General to be appointed from the ranks of the UN staff where he had served for over thirty years. He began his work with the UN in 1962 when he joined the World Health Organization in Geneva as a young administrator. Kofi's first recognition for his abilities came when someone from the Ford Foundation, who was recruiting for a leadership program for students to study at a university in the United States, approached Kofi at a student meeting and asked him to apply. Kofi was then a student at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. He won the fellowship and attended Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, completing his undergraduate work in economics in 1961. After completing his BA, he was offered a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to study for one year at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes International in Geneva. To complete his education, Kofi later returned to the United States as a Sloan Fellow and received a Master of Science degree in management in 1972 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). For most of his early UN career, Kofi Annan served in administrative positions in accounting, personnel, and other posts.

UN Secretaries-General have traditionally served two five-year terms, but the United States objected to a second term for Annan's predecessor, Boutros-Ghali. The Africa Group at the UN had insisted on an African as Secretary-General when Boutros-Ghali, from northern Africa's Egypt, was elected. However, when he was not accorded the traditional second term, the Africans insisted that another African, preferably now from Sub-Saharan Africa, should be chosen. Kofi Annan, by that time, had become known to the major powers as talented and trustworthy, and his candidacy emerged with the most positive votes and no vetoes in the Security Council which must approve the nomination before it goes to a full-member vote in the General Assembly. Annan had enough support from the major powers during his first term to be elected early, some five to six months earlier than usual, to a second term. After completing his second term as UN Secretary-General, Annan has continued to be involved in international issues, highlighted by his role in mediating a successful resolution to the conflict that arose in Kenya after its presidential election in 2007/2008 and in 2012 his selection by the UN and the

Arab League as special envoy for Syria. He also established the Kofi Annan Foundation housed in Geneva and served as the Chair of the Group of Elders until he passed away on August 18, 2018.

Kofi's Early Years in Ghana

Kofi, which means Friday, the day he was born, was part of an elite Ghanaian family. Born with a twin sister, Efua Atta, his full name is Kofi (Friday) Atta (twin) Annan. Both his mother and father are descendents of tribal chiefs from the dominant tribal groups in Ghana, his mother (Ruth) full Fante, and his father (Henry) part Fante and part Ashanti. In Ghanaian tradition, a man may take several wives and Kofi's mother, not being the first wife, did not live with them and Kofi did not see her very often until he was older. Both Kofi's parents were Christian, yet they gave their children African names. In describing his father, Kofi Annan states, "To him, there was no contradiction in being African in identity and European in outlook"¹

It seems that Henry Annan, despite his noble heritage, was not elected in the traditional manner as a chief, yet he was certainly a leader. His father was a top executive in the United African Company, a subsidiary of Lever Brothers, later known as Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch multinational. After independence in 1957, Henry was appointed as commissioner of the Ashanti region, an administrative position given to tribal leaders by the new government of Ghana.² In this way his tribal leadership was acknowledged, though in a more modern manner by the central government, instead of by tribal elders.

With the United African Company, Kofi's father moved the family from region to region around Ghana as he became district manager in different parts of the country. In an interview, Kofi explains: "It was very interesting for me to grow up dealing with and getting to know so many different groups in Ghana. It gave you a sense of being able to relate to everybody and different groups at a young age."³ When Henry became director of the company, the family moved to the capital, Accra, and the household became a hub for political debate. "Local notables were forever dropping into the Annan household to ask advice or, increasingly, to talk politics. Kofi sat in the background, neither speaking nor expected to speak."⁴ Henry Annan became a leader in one of the parties that supported independence, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) but took a more moderate stance, advocating a gradual move toward independence.

Our house in these days became a gathering point for senior members of the UGCC – to the point where Nkrumah activists would hold rallies in the park across the street. As a young man, I was deeply influenced by discussions going on at home with my father and his friends. At the same time, I was emotionally drawn to the passion and urgency of Nkrumah's calls for "independence now."⁵

While Kofi's father was not a tribal chief, per se, it appears as though he operated as such and was given the respect accorded to a chief. In Ghanaian tribal tradition, and Ashanti law, the chief must peacefully resolve local disputes, listen to complaints and does not speak in a loud voice. Kofi Annan explains, "among Ashantis themselves there was an important priority placed on compromise and negotiation. Indeed, the Ashanti king did not have his own army, but had to convince tribes and subtribes to provide troops in times of war and crisis."⁶ This sounds very familiar when thinking about Annan as Secretary-General of the UN, not having any troops of his own at his disposal. In his autobiography, Kofi describes his observations of his father in a way that profoundly reveals how Kofi Annan saw himself,

In this respect, my father was representative of a deeper cultural tradition of patience, negotiation, and reconciliation. For Ghanaians, the concept of the African palaver tree has always been a tangible part of our heritage, and a source of the relative peace and harmony among myriad tribes and religions. A place to meet and talk, to seek compromise and settle disputes, to bridge differences and foster unity – this was the meaning of the palaver tree.⁷

At all times, but particularly when resolving disputes, a traditional Ghanaian chief maintains a dignified, almost judgeliike, repose. The chief then relies on a chief minister or spokesman, referred to as the linguist, to pronounce the judgment or give out any rebuke.⁸ Kofi's very dignified reserve appears to be shaped by the observations of this tradition passed down through his father.⁹ He also, by many accounts as Secretary-General, listened very attentively as others spoke, not only other leaders, but his own advisers. A close colleague of Annan's, Ibrahim Gambari, who served as his under-secretary-general for political affairs stated in an interview that Annan "listens to everybody, synthesizes, and makes his decisions. And we all respected him for that because we felt he listened to us."

Gambari goes on to explain further the role that African chiefs traditionally have had to develop as a manner of listening to their people, or as Gambari uses the term, the chief's subjects:

In traditional African society, the subject insists on being heard, so people don't realize it's not just that the kings or the chief had the luxury of not listening to his people. He had to listen to his people, absolutely, no hierarchies, no protocol; they insist on being heard. The wise chief, the wise, traditional ruler was one that listens to his people, gives guidance; he has to lead by example. African traditions are very democratic in nature. They talk all issues out, almost to exhaustion before consensus, reaching consensus, because that is the goal. Talk everything through, and the chief has to listen, has to be patient, and that's how you judge a successful, good leader.¹⁰

But Gambari, (from Nigeria) warns not to take that as essentially an African or tribal trait:

Obviously, we are all in many ways the product of our culture, but it was him [Kofi Annan] too and his family. Because there are also other African leaders who are not like that. I think it's something about his personality, about his values, about his upbringing, about his family, you know his family. There are some things that are common that you might consider African, but it is not common to all African leaders. On the contrary, I've seen many African leaders who don't like strong advisers, don't like strong characters, don't listen very carefully, do what they want, with literally no regard for the views of even their advisers, who they hire and fire at will. So, I think one has to give credit to him.¹¹

Kofi Annan grew up in a well to do, stable family unit where he was absorbed into a transitional balancing of traditional tribal culture into the more modern industrialized culture that was growing in Ghana. His father was a symbol of that transition which combined both systems. A council of elders in the old system, as explained earlier, along with elite civic leaders in the modern system, would gather at his house discussing issues of the day. "Kofi once said he was brought up 'atribal in a tribal world.'"¹² An old photograph of Annan's extended family shows most of the men wearing suits, while about half the women wore European dresses and the other half had African head ties and traditional African dress.¹³ While Kofi observed the dignified manner of his father and the Ashanti king who frequented their house, his father also diligently trained his children to "explain their behavior with honesty and confidence, without stuttering and shuffling."¹⁴ This training by his father would explain Kofi's composure and his ability to speak very clearly and to the point.

Another trait that seems to emerge from Kofi's Ghanaian background, and particularly the mood of his years as a teenager, is his continual optimism. Throughout his speeches, off-the-cuff comments, and press conferences, he often refers to being optimistic about an eventual positive outcome. In an interview with this author, Annan explains:

I've always been hopeful. I feel one can make a difference. I think it's also my own experience as a youth. I came of age in the years of African independence. Ghana was the first [Sub-Saharan] African colony to become independent, and I was a teenager. I was in my teens. When we got independence, with the struggle, watching it, I was eighteen, nineteen then. And so you live in a colony where the governor is an Englishman, the police commissioner is an Englishman, the headmasters of some of the schools are English, and the bank manager. The struggle for independence starts, and you follow it. My father was active even though he was not in politics. He knew most of the politicians. They would come home and they would be talking about changes, and the need for independence, and the pace at which one should push for it. So, as a boy, you listen to all this

and it seems so far away when they are discussing it, how difficult and impossible. And then one day, this big exciting thing that everybody is fighting for, independence, is achieved. And in a way, you grow up thinking that change is possible, even a huge transformational change is possible because you've lived it and you've seen it. So I think in a way, I've always gone through life feeling that change is possible, and one should not give up; one should try.¹⁵

Kofi attended private schools in Ghana and those days left an impression on him. At fifteen he entered Mfantsipim, a prestigious, elite secondary school. Kofi often tells this story about his education in Ghana:

When I was a young man at the age of 15, I will never forget the experience I had with the headmaster who walked into a classroom. There were 45 of us. In those days, small classes were not the order of the day. You were lucky to get an education. So, there were 45 of us in the room, and he came in and put a sheet of paper on the wall with a black dot. The paper was quite white. It was about 1 meter by 1 meter with a dot. So, he asked, "Boys, what do you see?" Almost in unison, all of us shouted, "The black dot." He stood back and said, "So, none of you saw the broad, white sheet of paper. You all saw the black dot. Don't go through life focusing on the minor issue. See the total picture."¹⁶

This is a lesson that Kofi often mentions as having a profound effect on his thinking, focus on the big picture. For some students, this lesson may not have held any significance, but for Kofi, even more than 60 years later, he was still telling this story and framing it in such a way (at a press conference) as to ask others to also focus on the big picture, the total work that the UN tackles.

Annan recalls another personal tale of his school years when asked if he ever had a nickname:

They used to call me Demo -- short for democracy. I grew up in Ghana [in West Africa] at the time the country was getting its independence [from Britain], and there were lots of discussions at school about political systems. I was always talking about democracy. There were two Annans at school, so they called me Annan Demo.¹⁷

Annan was clearly absorbing the political environment not only at school but at home and was showing very early on his interest in political affairs and the world. Kofi was sociable at school and is remembered for his sense of humor, but was not always compliant. Whether it was the developing resistance movement and growing demands for democratic participation that

inspired the young Kofi, however, he organized and led a boycott at the school, demanding better food in the cafeteria. He even made sure that the boys had eaten before the boycott. The strategy worked and the menu was changed.¹⁸ What now appears odd, Annan was not considered a strong scholar by the head master and did not make a high enough score on his examinations for him to enter an academic college and instead he enrolled in the Kumasi Institute of Science and Technology. His leadership qualities were beginning to become apparent, nevertheless, and he was elected vice president of the Ghana national students' union. This enabled him to attend a conference in Sierra Leone of African student leaders where he made an impression on a representative of the Ford Foundation, as mentioned, who offered him a scholarship to attend Macalester College in the United States. Growing up in the Annan family and attending private schools in Ghana, Kofi was already becoming Westernized but studying in the United States would profoundly shape his development.

The UN and a Turning Point in Annan's Career

In 1962, Annan began his first job within the UN system at the World Health Organization. He may have been attracted by the humanitarian nature of the organization or he may have just needed a job. Nevertheless, once in the UN system he found a natural affinity to the type of humanitarian work it stands for. During most of his years within the UN, Annan was a bureaucrat, learning one type of management system and another. This enabled him later to understand the UN inside and out, but he was not identified as a political officer until much later. A profound event that would shape Annan's career as well as his sense of efficacy came when Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar sent Annan, at that time within the UN department of personnel, to Iraq in late September 1990 to try to free the 900 UN hostages that had been taken by Saddam Hussein before the outbreak of the first Gulf War in 1991.

It was his first political assignment and his skills at diplomatic negotiations successfully brought about the release of all the UN hostages. Annan had remained optimistic about achieving their release and did not leave Iraq until every last person had made it to Jordan for the airlift out, even though he had to struggle at the last minute to get a few who had been left behind the proper papers and get them transport to Amman.¹⁹ To further understand the way Annan's conscience worked and the effort he pressed upon himself, it is important to fill out this story. Annan, in working to release the UN hostages, discovered that some 500 thousand Asians from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and many other countries could not get out of Iraq or Kuwait and risked being slaughtered in the impending war. They had all suddenly lost their jobs and because most banks had closed down they could not retrieve any money they might have had to pay their way home. Annan explained, "These people were beggared overnight."²⁰

Annan attended several meetings of the Western Ambassadors in Baghdad who discussed ways of pressuring the Iraqis to release the Western hostages.

Unfortunately, the Asian and African ambassadors had not organized in the same

way. So he made the rounds of the Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and other ambassadors to collect estimates of the numbers of their nationals stranded in Iraq and Kuwait. "I got the figures from them," he said. "I think I was the first to give it to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry." [Tariq] Aziz soon agreed to allow the UN to organize airlifts to take the workers from Jordan to their homes.²¹

This achievement laid the groundwork for UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar to recommend Kofi Annan as Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs under Marrack Goulding. This achievement was not only a turning event in Annan's career but a profound learning experience. He was able to draw on his family life that welcomed a transitional mix of Western culture and that of the developing world. He had learned early on to be able to cross that divide with ease. He was also beginning to act upon the leadership role his father had provided. Thus, we see that Kofi's personality, his response to a humanitarian crisis, and his sense of efficacy, were not only shaped by early childhood and cultural experiences but also by major events in his adult life. Others would follow.

The Profound Effects of Adult Trauma: Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Oil-for-Food

Kofi Annan's sense of efficacy and diplomatic skills were emerging through this newly found political role. But along with high-level positions comes responsibility, not only for achievements but for missteps, debacles, and failures. These four traumas: Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Oil-for-Food crisis; not only weighed heavily on the UN, but involved Annan and his decision making. Not that he was to blame; the parties to the conflict were the ones killing each other and Saddam was responsible for the extortion schemes under Oil-for-Food. Nevertheless, Annan was involved and the human tragedy and accusations bore deeply into his conscience. A detailed explanation of each of these crises is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief summary is important in order to explain Annan's role.

Annan began his position as Assistant Secretary-General of Special Political Affairs as the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office in early 1992. The Cold War had just ended and there was a general euphoria that the UN could now take on the role of world peace that the founders had anticipated. When Boutros-Ghali created the new Department of Peacekeeping Operations that year, Goulding became the under-secretary-general there and Annan became his assistant secretary-general. A number of old conflicts were in the process of being resolved under UN auspices and perhaps leaders at the UN became overconfident. When massive starvation overtook Somalia in the early 1990s, Boutros-Ghali was interested in taking a proactive role. This met some resistance from Goulding who took more of a traditional approach to UN peacekeeping, not sending troops until a firm peace agreement had been reached and with consent of the parties. Boutros-Ghali found a more willing partner in Annan. Both had stronger ties to Africa and most likely felt the UN ought to take a more active role in addressing the suffering.

When the Security Council voted to reinforce the UN mission in Somalia in early 1993, Goulding was hesitant and Boutros-Ghali moved Goulding back to the Department of Political Affairs (as it was now called) and Annan was promoted to Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping. We now know, looking back, that clan warfare in Somalia made it impossible for the UN to achieve its goals of peace and stability in the country. When in October 1993, the US Delta Force failed in its efforts to disarm clan leader Aideed and 18 US soldiers were killed, with one soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu before CNN cameras, the UN was blamed. President Clinton then oversaw a new policy toward UN peacekeeping in which there would be a close examination of vital interests and an exit strategy before the UN would become committed to humanitarian operations. The Somali tragedy was not only a blow to the UN, but also to Kofi Annan, now the head of peacekeeping.

The Somali crisis was confounded and magnified geometrically by events in Rwanda. This is probably the crisis that has left the deepest wound in Kofi Annan's psyche. A peace agreement had been reached in 1993 in Rwanda between the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Hutu-led government. The UN Security Council had approved a peacekeeping operation (UNAMIR) of some 2,500 troops to be sent to Rwanda under Chapter 6 (use of force only in self-defense) to oversee the agreement. But by January 1994, barely 3 months after the Somali debacle, Force Commander Romeo Dallaire had received information that Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, was preparing to carry out a directed genocide of Tutsi civilians.

Dallaire sent a cable to UN headquarters in New York addressed to the military adviser to Boutros-Ghali, General Baril, asking that the informant be given asylum outside Rwanda and informing Baril that UNAMIR was planning to raid the cache of suspected weapons. Annan and his assistant, Iqbal Riza, read the cable as well, and told Dallaire not to raid the cache of weapons but instead to inform the Rwandan Hutu government of the breach of the agreement and also in Rwanda's capital Kigali to inform the ambassadors of the United States and France, and importantly, Belgium, who had the bulk of UN troops on the ground.²² Annan was still conscious of the repercussions following the raid on Aideed in Somalia and thought that a more diplomatic approach might work better. We know now that those attempts were fruitless. In hindsight, Kofi's judgment seems in error, and the results were horrific, but he was reacting to the debacle in Somalia and had no way of knowing the tragedy that lay ahead.

Additionally, Annan has been criticized for not immediately informing the Security Council of Dallaire's cable. To understand that decision, one has to look at the way Boutros-Ghali had structured the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and who was allowed to report to the Security Council. Boutros-Ghali had very narrow restrictions on who could address the Council. Only the Secretary-General himself or his adviser Chinmaya Gharekhan were allowed to go to the Council and Gharekhan was always very reluctant to do so. Realizing this would be a stumbling block must have played a role in trying to resolve the problem without alarming the Security Council. Annan also must have anticipated that the US mood, as a permanent member of the Council, would not be receptive to any proactive raid. We have to remember that this was a time of uncertainty, and the whole role of peacekeeping was being

watched. Still, Annan had insisted that those in Kigali be kept informed. When the genocide broke out in April 1994, even the most dramatic news coming out of Rwanda did not budge the Security Council nor the US leadership until nearly one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been murdered. Nevertheless, one question remains, why the informant was not given asylum; he was never heard from since.

Bosnia was another story. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was reaching its peak in early 1995. UN peacekeepers (UNPROFOR) were there as a humanitarian mission under Chapter 6 and did not have the mandate nor the capacity to stop what became mostly Serb attacks on Muslim Bosnian civilians. Ethnic cleansing was rampant and climaxed during the Srebrenica massacre of some 7-8,000 Muslim men and boys. This was followed by Serb-fired mortars on Sarajevo's Markale marketplace. The international community was crying for action. The UN had set up a system called duo-key whereby NATO and the UN Secretary-General had to both agree before any NATO bombing of Serb areas could be undertaken. Boutros-Ghali in the past had been reluctant to authorize bombing even though the US had been calling for a NATO response for some time. The French and British who had peacekeepers on the ground and in the way, had also been cautious. But with these bold Serb attacks, they were ready.

They regrouped their peacekeepers, circling the wagons in anticipation of the Serb response. The NATO hand was ready to turn the key. Madeleine Albright [US ambassador to the UN] tried to get Boutros on the telephone to get him to turn it too. But he was in a commercial airliner en route to an official visit to the Caribbean. He was unreachable. Boutros had "passed the key" to Kofi during the brief time that he was unavailable. When Madeleine asked Kofi, he didn't hesitate. He said yes.

Richard Holbrooke told Phillip Gourevitch of *The New Yorker*, "When Kofi turned that key, he became Secretary-General-in-waiting."²³

The Dayton Accords in the fall of 1995 brought an end to the war in Bosnia, but the black mantle of shame once again fell across the UN as it was blamed for not protecting the safe areas and allowing ethnic cleansing to go unchecked for so long. Kofi's positive profile in the Bosnia case brought attention to him in a way that Boutros-Ghali may not have appreciated. By that time, Boutros-Ghali was thinking about serving a second term when his current one expired at the end of 1996. Seeing Annan as a potential competitor, he sent him to Bosnia as his special representative, giving his post as under-secretary-general for peacekeeping to Ismat Kitani. However, Annan cleverly only agreed to go if he could regain his former position upon his return. That request was accepted. While Kofi emerged as a hero in the Bosnia affair, in contrast to Rwanda, he still suffered along with the UN for the atrocities that had taken place, once again.

While these three events happened before Kofi Annan became Secretary-General, another and more deeply personal blow landed in Kofi's second term as Secretary-General. The tragedy of the Oil-for-Food accusations -- that Annan had some culpability in the extortion scandals which in the end proved completely false -- is that he so deeply cared about getting food and medicine to the Iraqi people through the program. Resolution 986 which created the Oil-for-Food program was passed in 1995 and by December 1996 the UN had everything in place to begin the sale of oil in order to buy the needed food and medicine. When Kofi Annan took office, the Secretariat was asked to make a full report on the program, up to that point and in March 1997, the Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 986 was ready. Annan took the report very seriously, and while acknowledging the complexity of the undertaking, was very concerned about the slow pace of the distribution, stating:

Nevertheless, I have strong concerns about the pace at which the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) are being implemented. I have directed that a number of steps be taken both within the Secretariat and in the Security Council Committee to look for innovative and flexible approaches to overcome the constraints that the Programme has encountered. . . . These measures will accelerate the pace for the delivery of food, medicines, and other supplies that are urgently needed by the people of Iraq. Simultaneously, I am taking steps to ensure that adequate funds are available to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations agencies so that the necessary arrangements are completed for the delivery and observation of humanitarian assistance provided for in resolution 986 (1995).²⁴

The accusations against Annan hurt very deeply, not only because they were false but also because he had worked so hard to make the program a success in getting the needed provisions to the people of Iraq. The effects of these traumas will be further discussed in the next section.

Annan as UN Secretary-General:

Annan took office as Secretary-General on January 1, 1997. Immediately drawing on his UN experience, Kofi Annan set out with a broad agenda. First, he wanted to overhaul the very tightly controlled manner in which his predecessor had operated the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. Kofi Annan wanted greater transparency, greater openness and communication among the departments, and the ability of those who knew the most about an issue to be able to report to the Security Council or to the press Spokesman, when needed. He was determined to open up the UN, both in its decision making processes, and in its relations with the people. He created a "cabinet" of the top under-secretaries that met every Wednesday. He also held a lunch with the entire Security Council each month as the presidency of the Council rotates on a monthly basis. He also reached out to the heads of all the UN agencies,

funds, and programs, and worked to encourage them to coordinate their activities in a more productive manner. These ideas and actions are demonstrated in his declassified papers even in the first several months of his first term. As we can clearly see, Annan's leadership management type falls into a collegial model, working as a team effort.

By observing several Secretaries-General, he knew the complex role he would have to play as administrator to the Member States. He saw his role as a moral leader to the peoples of the world, upholder of international law, head of a large bureaucracy, and peace mediator in times of crisis. He also understood the UN needed to reform and he began a reform effort in his first days that lasted throughout his tenure. Annan states that "the biggest impediment to change and reform in the bureaucracy is the restraint bureaucrats put on themselves."²⁵ This was most profoundly ingrained in him in the days just before the outbreak of the genocide in Rwanda when members of the staff decided not to take critical information to the Security Council, believing (and rightly so) that the members would do nothing. He tried through his more open policy process to empower the staff to speak freely.

When Annan took office in January 1997, he immediately began to restructure the Secretariat under a new paradigm of transparency and communication. One of his first acts, on January 6, was to dramatically change the policy of his predecessor which had been to only allow the Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, or his adviser, Chinmaya Gharekhan, to brief the Security Council. In this short note to the under-secretary-general for political affairs, Murrack Goulding, signed by the Secretary-General's chief of staff, Iqbal Riza, Annan completely changes this policy:

Note to Mr. Goulding

Briefing to the Security Council on the situation in the Great Lakes region

The Security Council will hold informal consultations on the situation in the Great Lakes region on Wednesday, 8 January.

The Secretary-General would wish you to brief on his behalf the members of the Security Council on this topic.

Thank you.

S. Iqbal Riza
6 January 1997²⁶

On 13 January, he broadened that policy, made very clear by the following inter-office memo which he directed to several under-secretaries, including Chinmaya Gharekhan:

Subject: Briefings and reports to the Security Council

1. As substantive Departments assume enhanced responsibilities and authority for their functional areas, the reporting by your Departments should follow the guidelines below.
2. Where the Security Council is concerned, the Department of Political Affairs retains the primary responsibility for monitoring the deliberations of the Security Council and for providing it with the political information required. In parallel, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs will attend Security Council meetings (both consultations and formal) as required and provide the Council with information relating to their peace-keeping and humanitarian responsibilities. Heads of Departments will determine when it is appropriate for them to brief the Council personally, or through their staff, ensuring consistency in this practice. Of course, it is vital that all three Departments coordinate closely, each acting as the lead Department where it has principal responsibility.²⁷

While other Secretaries-General, and particularly Boutros-Ghali, had been more reclusive and less transparent, Annan set out not only to change the atmosphere to one that was more open, he also began to enhance policy coordination and build teamwork. As an insider, he had the advantage of experiencing the weaknesses of the Organization when there was a lack of policy coordination. He immediately created the Senior Management Group (SMG) which included all the heads of departments, as a kind of cabinet to provide a structure for dialogue, exchange, and policy advice. In addition, he established a Policy Coordination Group: the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ESPS) which would meet every month, with the three lead departments (political affairs, peacekeeping, and humanitarian affairs) meeting every week. The members of ESPS also included heads of legal affairs, human rights, development, refugees, the executive office of the Secretary-General, and special representatives of the Secretary-General as needed.²⁸

Annan continued to emphasize teamwork as he stated in this speech to a gathering of his special and personal representatives held in 2001, when he gave them this advice:

Keep in constant dialogue with everyone in the United Nations team. Try to hold meetings with your immediate staff every day, and set aside time to thrash out deeper issues. Meet regularly with the larger United Nations team to discuss not only what they can do to help your work, but also how you can help them in theirs. Sit together with them, plan with them, implement with them. Bilateral donors, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations, too, can be rich sources of goodwill if tapped properly -- again, through dialogue.²⁹

Annan's emphasis on team work and open dialogue represents his early exposure to the kind of dialogue he experienced in his home with his father and the local leaders, elders, and the tribal tradition of listening and building consensus. As Gambari stated, this was not just his African experience, but how Kofi absorbed that experience into his own personality. The lesson that he often quotes from the master of his school in Ghana also appears in Annan's own words in explaining his approach to policy. In the following answer to a question posed at a press conference in Israel after having met with the president, Moshe Katsev, Annan demonstrates his insistence on looking at the larger picture:

"But what I would want to see is a clearer definition of the road ahead, with time-lines ... so that people do not think the only issue they are dealing with is a ceasefire." The Secretary-General added that people have to see that there are good and positive things ahead to give hope and to encourage them to work for peace.³⁰

This short statement is a complex example of several of Annan's values and personality: the need to see the larger picture, to be optimistic, and the fact that he saw himself as being the giver of hope, that, as a world leader, he had some responsibility as a guide to hope, and to ward off despair. Annan said several times that he would often make declarations on people's human rights, so that those who had been victims and were still vulnerable to retribution could quote him on human rights, and not suffer the consequences, because they were just quoting what he had said. Another lesson that Annan incorporated into his lexicon of personal traits is his experience while at Macalester College in Minnesota when he first encountered the northern winter cold. After nearly freezing his ears, he finally gave in and started wearing earmuffs.

I would put on layers and layers of clothing to get warm. But I was determined not to use earmuffs because I thought they were not elegant. Until one day I almost lost my ears to the cold, so I went and bought the biggest pair of earmuffs I could find. From that day on, I learned that you never walk into a situation and believe that you know better than the natives. You have to listen and look around.³¹

In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association, he reveals how that lesson shaped the way he looked at policy formation:

We start from the observation that our prevention efforts can only be effective if they are undertaken with the cooperation of Member States. In each case, we need to start by looking at the society we are trying to help. We cannot impose models or behaviours on the people we are working to support, but instead should look to them to guide what we do, and how we should do it. Conflict prevention must be a home-grown process.³²

As Kent Kille discusses in his book *From Manager to Visionary*, Kofi Annan approached decision making in a strategic manner. He would carefully lay the groundwork, build consensus, cultivate a grassroots understanding of the issues, but he also paid very close attention to timing. In an interview, Annan explains his strategy:

Timing is very important in this Organization. You can kill a brilliant idea by moving too soon. And once they've shot it down, it can become very difficult to revive it. And I know it is difficult because we have a tendency to want to act, and it's much more difficult sometimes to sit back. But I believe that there is a time to sit and let things happen because whatever you do will not make a difference. And there comes a time when you need to move to make things happen because the timing is right.³³

At an off-the-cuff encounter with the press after having met with the Security Council, Annan explains his decision-making process as he applied it to the Middle East question:

I wouldn't call the discussions or the process I went through to decide "indecision". I think it was assessing the situation, analysing the situation, working with our partners for peace, and determining the right timing to go to the region, and when I thought it would be most opportune and helpful to go. So it was a question of analysis, a question of coordinating with others, and a question of timing. And so I am going at the precise moment that I think I should go. The other things, the previous discussions and all were part of the process.³⁴

Annan and Africa

While Kofi Annan had grown up in Africa, he had lived most of his adult life either in Geneva or in the United States. Therefore, he was not well known among Africans and at first the Africans did not have much empathy for him. But as Ibrahim Gambari of Nigeria, explains, "they felt he understood them instinctively and that he cared really about Africa. . . . So I think in that sense his sympathy with Africa grew . . . looking over the years you also saw that the man grew in the job; there's no doubt about it." Gambari explains that in that regard only the African Kofi Annan could get away with criticizing African leaders and holding them accountable, as he did in his speech to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit when he challenged them to uphold human rights in their respective countries and to embrace democracy, not as a Western imposition, but out of responsibility to their own peoples. In an interview, Kofi explains what prompted him to make the now famous speech in Harare at the OAU summit in 1997:

I think I felt that Africa had reached a stage where it should be able to keep its soldiers and generals in the barracks, and those who were in office, to send them back to the barracks. I was also looking at an evolution in Latin America, where they had been able and in a way were sending their soldiers back to the barracks. The economic and political development in Africa had been distorted because of the number of coup d'etats and the number of people who took part through the barrel of the gun. So, I was trying to encourage them to have a new beginning and really try and make sure that the people who were going to lead were elected by the people and are accountable to the people. When I made that speech, Salim Salim, [Secretary-General of the OAU at the time] . . . said to me, "Let me tell you, you are the only one who can make such a speech in this room at this time and walk away unlynched."³⁵

What Salim Salim was referring to was that there were a number of military dictators in the room, notably Robert Mugabe, because the meeting took place in Harare, Zimbabwe. As we know from Kofi's nickname in school "Annan Demo" he had grown up listening to discussions of politics at home and at school of African independence and democracy. These early impressions stayed with Annan and he felt because he had grown up with these ideas, he would be able, by rights, to encourage African leaders to take a look at Africa through this lens. Annan talks about his role as an African at an off-the-cuff question and answer encounter:

I think being a Ghanaian and an African, as Secretary-General it has had an impact and raised the profile of the continent, and from the reactions I get from black peoples everywhere and I think, I hope it has inspired some of them to work harder, and to reach out and live their dreams. I am often reminded of something that Eleanor Roosevelt said, advising a group of young women, but I think it also applies to other minority situations, she said, "No one can make you feel inferior, unless you give your consent." And I hope what I have achieved and done is an inspiration for others.³⁶

Annan traveled frequently to Africa, attending conferences and working with leaders at side meetings as well as directly in their countries. Because most peacekeeping operations take place in Africa, Annan spent much of his time working to enhance conflict resolution efforts that would inevitably arise on a day-to-day basis. In attempting to prevent the return to conflict, he met with the leaders of Nigeria and Cameroon to establish a boundary commission to peacefully oversee the demarcation of the border between the two countries once a decision was announced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In another case between Namibia and Botswana, Annan encouraged the two countries to resolve their dispute over some islands in the Caprivi River dividing the two neighbors by taking the issue to the ICJ. He then made available to them funds so they could have enough resources to support their arguments before the Court and

ultimately end the fighting through peaceful means. When allegations arose about UN humanitarian workers and peacekeepers in African missions abusing refugees or other vulnerable persons, Annan called for an investigation to uncover the truth about what was going on. The report was very blunt and honest about the problem and the UN set in motion new policies to address the problem. Much of Annan's focus on combating poverty and forming the Millennium Development Goals applied to enhancing development worldwide, but arose out of his sense of concern for the African continent. So, while many Africans did not really know him when he took office, he did more than any other Secretary-General to bring the needs of Africans to the world stage.

Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect

I discussed earlier the personal role and impact that the humanitarian crises in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia had on Annan before he became Secretary-General. These horrific events weighed heavily on him and soon after he took office in the spring of 1997, he hosted a dinner party at which he asked Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor, to talk about the concept of humanitarian intervention. He then asked all the guests to discuss the issue and over dessert report to the whole gathering what they had discussed. Kofi listened carefully and absorbed what they said.³⁷ Several months later, he was asked to give a speech at Ditchley in the United Kingdom in June 1998, at a gathering of high-level dignitaries and he asked Edward Mortimer, who would later become his speechwriter, to write the speech for him on the issue of humanitarian intervention. These early forays into examining the concept led the way to Annan's speech in the General Assembly in September 1999, after the events in Kosovo and East Timor had revealed once again the urgency of intervening on behalf of victims of genocide and crimes against humanity. Annan explains why he gave this controversial speech:

I think I gave that speech in the General Assembly because despite the experience of the earlier years, and by that I'm talking about the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, we had quite a bit of debate about Kosovo and whether there should have been an intervention in Kosovo. So, it led me to believe that we haven't really resolved the issue, and here we were in '99 with Kosovo going through it again. I remember the Russian position and others. So, I thought I should put the issue on the table. It hasn't been resolved; it wasn't going to go away. But I wanted the Member States to think about it, to think about it in the sense that Kosovo may not be the last one. We may have our disagreement, but let's look down the line.³⁸

The speech in the General Assembly represents a number of traits in Kofi Annan's personality. The trauma of adult experience shaped his concern for the suffering of innocent people at the hands of those who were seen as protected by the sovereignty of the state. His own

personal need to address this issue on moral, ethical grounds would not let him be passive, even though his actions would become controversial. He also was building a strategy for timing, and first needed to build over several months his thoughts on the issue and then carefully choose the right time and place. The events of Kosovo followed so rapidly by the rampage in Dili in East Timor, offered the media attention, and the General Assembly's opening session in September offered the right audience: all the Member States. Some governments embraced the right to intervene but many, particularly in the developing world, were vociferously against it. And Kofi was heavily attacked by the President of the General Assembly in 1999, Theo Ben-Gurirab of Namibia. The Canadians came to Annan's rescue and formed a commission to study the concept which resulted in the well-known report, the Responsibility to Protect. In the report they turn the concept around by claiming that it is not just a passive right to intervene but a responsibility if the host nation is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. Kofi has said, "I give them credit for being better diplomats than I am in the sense that I refer to humanitarian intervention, but they came up with the responsibility to protect, which is much more elegant."³⁹

Bully pulpit

As UN expert Brian Urquhart has said, the Secretary-General has no resources of his own to carry out policy, therefore, the public profile and figure of the office is the only base from which a Secretary-General can build norms and challenge the international community. According to Annan, who has been perhaps the only Secretary-General to use his office as a bully pulpit, "quite frankly, there's very little the Secretary-General can do himself or can do alone. . . . You have to come up with inspirational things, and then empower people and then encourage people to go out and do it. . . . So, if you don't use that bully pulpit and your voice, you restrain yourself severely, in my judgment." He acknowledges that had he served during the Cold War, it would have been quite different. "The end of the Cold War gave me some freedom in the sense that the world was changing. . . . So, on the issues of promotion of democracy, individual rights, human rights, since everyone claimed either they were democratic or imagined democracy, or aspiring to be democratic, they couldn't really take you on forcefully in public."⁴⁰

Annan took great advantage of his office as a bully pulpit, promoting human rights, pressing the norm the Responsibility to Protect, and developing a conscience within major corporations around the world by creating the Global Compact whereby companies would sign on to a code of conduct on human and worker's rights. He took on the fight against HIV/AIDS as a personal priority by forming the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, and pressing countries to contribute funding. People who worked with him have said that he would create a "peg" of an idea he wanted to promote and then he would work over time hanging things on that peg. He also continued the practice of every Secretary-General of trying to find peaceful solutions to conflicts around the world by using his "good offices" as a means of mediation.

Annan felt strongly that the United Nations must stand for the common good and be an Organization for the peoples. As author Kent Kille has suggested, a Secretary-General can be

observed for how much emphasis he places on the promotion of the values of the UN and the UN Charter. Annan believed very deeply in the goals of the UN and upholding the rule of law as embodied in the Charter. When the war broke out in Iraq without Security Council approval in the spring of 2003, he found himself in an untenable position. On the one hand, he believed in the peaceful resolution of conflict and the authority of the Security Council. The Charter states any use of force must be authorized by the UN Security Council, except in the case of self-defense after having been attacked. Yet, he also had to remain impartial in the face of all the Member States, particularly the permanent members, including especially the US. It was an impossible balancing act. Some of the Members implored him to declare openly that the War in Iraq was illegal, but he resisted that pressure. What he continued to say when pressed by the media was that the war was "not in conformity with the UN Charter."

However, in a fateful interview with the BBC, and most likely out of fatigue, after stating his mantra about not being in conformity with the UN Charter, the interviewer continued to push saying doesn't that mean it is illegal? While Kofi finally agreed with the interviewer's perspective, Annan never said the word "illegal." Nevertheless, that is how it came out in the press and Annan paid dearly for this. Members of the conservative right in the United States, who never support the United Nations at any rate, began an aggressive attack on Annan. The disclosures of discrepancies in the oil-for-food program that were coming out became the ammunition that they were looking for and the onslaught was severe and persistent. Calls for Annan to resign bore down on him and he almost did resign. Only after a lengthy report by the Volcker Commission, that took over a year to complete, found Annan innocent of the allegations and only criticized him for not overseeing the program more aggressively, did Annan emerge from a deep depression. Once this personal crisis was over, he began to recover. In his final years as Secretary-General, he took up once again the fight against poverty and the Millennium Development Goals. At the 60th Anniversary of the UN, in 2005, Annan pushed for the heads of state attending the summit to sign onto a list of eight goals and criteria for their achievement by 2015. The Outcome Document which also contained language on the support for the Responsibility to Protect was accepted unanimously by a vote of consensus in the final day of the summit. With this achievement, Annan had recovered.

Annan: personality traits and type

Annan's personality traits of upholding tolerance for different points of view, listening to others, being a team builder, and maintaining the capacity to see the big picture, place him into a flexible and pragmatic personality type. Annan fits well into the Milton Rokeach model of open-mindedness, able to address cognitive complexities and the ability to seek differentiated information about others. He never really sought power for its own sake. And, once he took office he understood the limitations on his power. His motivations did not include power, but definitely leaned toward goal achievement and affiliation with his team. He used his position to promote the values of the UN, and not his own ego. He had a strong sense of efficacy

demonstrated by his constant efforts at strategically advancing norms and holding state leaders accountable. He was innovative while in office, constantly creating new structures, like the Global Compact, the UN Funds to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, and the Millennium Development Goals. His efforts at reforming management within the Secretariat were to create greater transparency, better communication, remove the secrecy and the authoritarian framework of the past, and delegate responsibilities and trust. While some of these characteristics might be seen as handing off responsibility, Annan was a team player who trusted those around him. He was not distant from decision-making, but was very interested in governance and was not easily manipulated. He listened to his advisers and took their advice, but he ultimately made the decisions. He was always curious to learn about other points of view and other cultures, saying that you cannot impose a solution on people; it must evolve out of their own understandings. He was pragmatic in his strategy to build consensus and carefully waiting for the right timing to press an issue. If there is a fault, it might be his willingness to trust those around him too much and leave them do their work. In the Oil-for-Food crisis, the Volcker report accused him of not forcefully overseeing the process. But that was not his style. He trusted the leaders of the Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) to do their jobs and he trusted the Security Council's 661 Committee to do theirs. We now know that did not happen.

As a team decision maker, Annan utilized a collegial management model. His creation of his Senior Management Group and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security demonstrate that model. Advisers like Ibrahim Gambari confirm that these bodies were really joint efforts and not just window dressing. Annan's self-confidence and desire to work as a team follows this tradition.

While understanding the formation of personality, how it is shaped, and the linkage between personality and decision making, it is a much bigger leap of uncertainty to be able to predict decisions in future unknown environments. Nevertheless, increasing our understanding can perhaps benefit how we select our leaders, deal with them in diplomatic situations, or even offer opportunities for self-examination.

While Kofi Annan's dignity, charisma, and support for UN values brought him great respect among some in the international community, others resented his overreach and even defiance in the face of some Member States. On the extreme, some even hated him. Yet, his identification with the Secretariat staff always made him conscious of keeping up morale and he was appreciated for the respect he gave in that regard. On the day that he left office right before the holidays at the end of December in 2006, he announced that he would say goodbye to the staff in the large UN cafeteria on the main floor of the UN headquarters in New York. I had an office in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the time and intended to go to the reception in the cafeteria but when I approached the hallway to the cafeteria I was met with an overwhelming crowd of staff members coming from all directions, even from across the street on First Avenue where many of the offices were located. Lines were out the doors to the UN and filled the hallways. It was impossible, even going early, to get into the cafeteria. Security guards were only letting people in when someone came out. Finally, Kofi Annan came out into the hallway

and went down the line of everyone there, shaking hands with all who came to say goodbye. Even he was overwhelmed.

Perhaps some shared the same sentiment as this person attending an off-the-cuff Q and A:

Mr. Secretary-General, first, if you will allow me, I will just make a brief comment and then I will ask a question. My comment is this -- there are very few people ever in history who are seen as embodying in dedication to the betterment of all mankind and very few people who, when they are seen as the embodiment of dedication to all mankind do it with humility and grace, but I suspect that I speak for almost everyone in this room when I say that you are that embodiment and we thank you very much.⁴¹

This comment was made in May 2001, a few months before Kofi Annan and the United Nations were given the Nobel Peace Prize in the fall of 2001. However, a shadow fell over the announcement and the award ceremony. The horrific events of September 11, 2001, had taken place only a few weeks before the announcement of the Nobel Prize and the award was lost in the media frenzy of the time. Nevertheless, Kofi Annan still played a leadership role in international affairs. Known for his skills at mediation and the respect he retained internationally, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named Annan in spring 2012 as the Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Syria. His skills and motivation to seek a mediated peaceful solution to the conflict emanate from his personality as it developed through his family and cultural experiences growing up in Ghana. He served as envoy for six months before he stepped down, saying that he had “lost his team on the road to Damascus,” referring to the divisiveness within the UN Security Council.

In summary, Kofi Annan is known for his support of the “peoples” of the world, returning the focus of the UN to the words stated in the opening to the UN Charter: “We, the Peoples of the United Nations.” His optimism and his achievement motivation enabled him to believe that peaceful solutions are possible but his sense of reality of the situational context also grounded him in the possible. As a proponent of human rights, he used his position as a world leader to give a voice to the voiceless and to set an agenda for the UN in the Millennium Development Goals to offer hope to the most vulnerable. As a norm entrepreneur, he has left his imprint through such initiatives as humanitarian intervention, the Global Compact to bring the business community into great harmony with the human rights goals of the UN, and his continued support for the rule of law. Through various key moments in his life, people recognized Kofi Annan’s capacities for leadership, but how he applied these skills ultimately depended on his internal absorption of these qualities and how he perceived the situational context surrounding him.

*This article is adapted from a chapter I wrote on Kofi Annan for: *Personality, Political Leadership, and Decision Making: A Global Perspective*, Jean Krasno and Sean LaPides, editors, Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2015.

¹ Kofi Annan with Nader Mousavizadeh, *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), page 15.

² James Traub, *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in an Era of American World Power*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), page 27.

³ Stanley Meisler, *Kofi Annan: a Man of Peace in a World of War*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), page 12.

⁴ Traub, page 28.

⁵ Annan, page 19.

⁶ Ibid, page 20.

⁷ Ibid, page 21.

⁸ Captain R.S. Rattray, *Ashanti Law and Constitution*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929).

⁹ Of note is that according to Ashanti tradition, a chief and anyone in the presence of a chief must not cross his legs; in many of my meetings with Kofi Annan and observing him in other situations, he never crosses his legs, even while others in the room are doing so.

¹⁰ Interview with Ibrahim Gambari, by Jean Krasno, on June 3, 2009, at the United Nations in New York.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Meisler, page 11.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interview with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Jean Krasno, on Friday, March 21, 2008, in New York City.

¹⁶ Press Conference at the Japan National Press Club, January 24, 2001, in *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), page 1356.

¹⁷ This interview with young people was published in the May 2001 issue of *Nickelodeon Magazine*, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), page 1467.

¹⁸ Traub, page 28.

¹⁹ Ibid, pages 49-50.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Annan, pages 46-59.

²³ Fred Eckhard, Draft Manuscript, 31 October 2008, page 12.

²⁴ Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Resolution 986 (1995), Security Council document: S/1997/206, March 10, 1997, paragraphs 24 and 25; in the *Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), page 48.

²⁵ Interview with Kofi Annan by Thomas Weiss on April 29, 2002, in in *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages xiii-xxv.

²⁶ Note to Mr. Goulding of January 6, 1997, released from UN Archives, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), page 4.

²⁷ Interoffice Memo from Kofi Annan to several heads of Departments on January 13, 1997, from UN Archives, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 8-9.

²⁸ Note to the Secretary-General from Marrack Goulding on February 5, 1997, from UN Archives, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 32-33.

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- ²⁹ Speech by the Secretary-General on March 30, 2001, at the Seminar for Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General at Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland, document number SG/SM/7760, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 1437-1439.
- ³⁰ Noon Briefing by the deputy spokesman for the Secretary-General, Manoel Almeida e Silva, on June 18, 2001, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 1527-1528.
- ³¹ This interview with young people was published in the May 2001 issue of *Nickelodeon Magazine*, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), page 1467.
- ³² Speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on March 21, 2001, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 1422-1424.
- ³³ Interview with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Jean Krasno, on Friday, March 21, 2008, in New York City.
- ³⁴ Off-the-cuff comments by Kofi Annan outside the Security Council on June 8, 2001, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 1515-1516.
- ³⁵ Interview with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Jean Krasno, on Friday, March 21, 2008, in New York City.
- ³⁶ Question and answer session with the Secretary-General following the Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University on June 19, 2001, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 1528-1532.
- ³⁷ Traub, page 92.
- ³⁸ Interview with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Jean Krasno, on Friday, March 21, 2008, in New York City.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Exchange between the Secretary-General and the UN Association of Greater Boston, on May 20, 2001, in *The Collected Papers of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*, by Jean Krasno (editor), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pages 1490-1494.