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
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DESA JG (Des) FTA R 11/6



REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON OUTCOME OF THE BALI PREPCOM OF WSSD

I place below a first report on the outcome of the Bali PrepCom and the road from Bali to Johannesburg. I apologize for the length of the report which is a consequence of a 25 hour plane journey and about nine hours of working at various airports en route!

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
Outcome

The Bali PrepCom for WSSD concluded short of its target of finalizing the action programme. The text of the Programme that is being transmitted is about 70 per cent agreed, which is better than for most conferences. The bulk of the material on programme content and institutional issues is agreed. However, the part that remains is highly contentious and will require not just technical negotiation but serious political bargaining. The key outstanding issues are:

1. The US difficulty with the concept of "common but differentiated responsibility" which is central to many environmental agreements. ||
2. The desire of the G-77 to push the envelope on trade and finance beyond Doha and Monterrey and the unwillingness of the OECD countries to do this. ||
3. The G-77 insistence on language on financial commitment that treats the Monterrey pledges as a floor rather than a ceiling. ||
4. The G-77 and EU insistence that the sectoral programmes must include targets and timetables and the unwillingness of the U.S., Australia and sometimes Japan to consider any new targets. ||
5. The texts on good governance at the domestic level and human rights. |

Transition from Indonesian to South African leadership

Toward the end of the Bali PrepCom there was some talk of suspending the PrepCom, which would have meant that the Indonesian Chairman, Dr. E. Salim, and the Bureau would continue functioning until Johannesburg with, possibly a resumed PrepCom session to complete the negotiations. This did not seem a good option for two reasons - the desire of the South African Government to take the lead from now rather than wait until Johannesburg and the very real risk that a resumed PrepCom would not be able to resolve problems that require some bridge building at a higher political level.



Before the closing session began I met with the South African delegation and explained the options to them and advised them to reach out to the Indonesians, who have the support of many Asian countries. I then arranged for the two foreign ministers to

To discuss with JG/Desai

Done: #3 12 June 12/6

meet and things worked out quite smoothly. South Africa invited the Indonesian Government and Dr. Salim to help in facilitating the informal processes of dialogue/negotiation leading to Johannesburg. The PrepCom was not suspended but closed; therefore, the Bureau stands dissolved. The Indonesians have accepted this with good grace and effectively (but not yet formally) the political leadership is with South Africa.

Next steps

There are four areas where we need to define next steps clearly in the light of the outcome of the Bali PrepCom – the strategy to build political involvement and support, the negotiating process, the orchestration of the sectoral initiatives, and the communication strategy.

The direct and visible engagement of President Mbeki and the Secretary-General is central for the political strategy. I believe some countries who are committed in this process are thinking of a sherpa group of senior ministers (preferably with broader coordination or policy responsibilities) working out a “deal”, for instance, on the trade and finance issues which will surface in Johannesburg and helping to formulate a bold declaration for the Summit. The Secretary-General could consider naming a senior envoy to such a group (Pronk? Zedillo?) or, if the South Africans are amenable, convening such a group jointly with them in order to establish that this is a U.N. summit. Of course, other opportunities like the G-8 summit, the OAU summit could also be used for this purpose.

The negotiating process in Bali cleared what could be done at a bureaucratic level. What remains requires engagement at the higher level. South Africa is planning consultations with key governments on the political declaration and on outstanding issues on the programme of action. Their hope is that if they have the support of the key governments they can get it approved formally in Johannesburg. The main snag in this is that G-77 dynamics requires being involved as a group. We could suggest very regular briefings of the group by the South African mission to the U.N.

The U.S. is central both for the political strategy and for the negotiating process. If they stick to the hard line they took in Bali, then a consensus is difficult. They need to be persuaded that Johannesburg is an opportunity for them to show a continuing willingness to meet developing country concerns which they did show in Doha and Monterrey.

The several initiatives outlined in WEHAB have been well received and are included in the agreed text of the Bali outcome. After discussions led by the Deputy Secretary-General in Bali, we decided to set up a Sector Planning Working Group headed by a senior UNDP staff member and with specialists on loan from UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank, WHO, UNICEF and FAO. This group would flesh out the WEHAB

initiatives and be our interlocutor with the relevant Type II initiatives. (These are non-negotiated voluntary initiatives contributing to agreed summit goals organized by governments, international organisations, corporations, NGOs, etc.)

The countries that are promoting Type II initiatives recognize the need for some coherence and are coming together to define a country-led coordination process (the U.S. is very active in this area). The extent to which they want the U.N. system involved in not yet clear.

With regard to communications, we have to work out a strategy to explain the Bali outcome, and to emphasize that the outstanding issues need to be resolved at a high political level. But more than that we need to reach the political leadership with the message that a disappointing result in Johannesburg could undo the positive mood generated by the Monterrey commitments. //



Nitin Desai
10 June 2002

cc: Deputy Secretary-General
Mr. M. Malloch Brown
Mr. K. Töpfer
Mr. S. Tharoor