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JUL 27 1999  
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE  
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Note to the Secretary-General

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS  
ON OPCW MISSION TO IRAQ

*SB*  
*(direct)*  
*10/27/99*  
*28*  
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*29/7*

1. The Security Council met this morning in pursuance of the President's ruling of last evening. In the course of the discussion, the Russian Federation representative raised the subject of the letter from the Director-General of the OPCW to me dated 23 July on the technical feasibility of overpacking the 7 vials of VX standards and leaving them in the UNSCOM premises, maintaining that this was new information. The U.S. and U.K. representatives refuted this, stating that the option of leaving the VX standards in Baghdad had been known. I also explained the background to the letter of 23 July and the fact that the destruction of the VX standards was consistent with the mandate.

2. The final outcome was the ruling of the President, in accordance with his ruling of 26 July, that there was no consensus to change the original mandate and that the Council will request the Secretary-General to furnish additional information in response to the questions posed by the Chinese representative and supported by some other members of the Council, including a full account of the use of VX standards kept by UNSCOM.

3. Shortly after the conclusion of these discussions and after discussion with Mr. Riza, I spoke to Mr. Jose Bustani, Director-General of the OPCW on the phone. I reported to him the final outcome of the Security Council consultations this morning, and conveyed your request, in the light of the President's ruling, to proceed with the destruction of the VX standards as part of the original mandate contained in my letter of 24 June to Mr. Bustani.

4. A letter from the President to you requesting additional information on the handling of VX standards by UNSCOM will be received shortly and should, in my view, be directed to the Officer-in-Charge of UNSCOM, Mr. Charles Duelfer, for reply.

*Attached*  
*(file)*

*Jayantha Dhanapala*  
Jayantha Dhanapala  
27 July 1999

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991415

S.C.  
#9 28 July

**DRAFT***(Sent to Council  
Members Tues. pm.)*

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council held three separate sessions of consultations of the whole on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission despatched to Iraq, in the light of the concerns of the members of the Council, to assist the United Nations in the closure of the UNSCOM chemical laboratory in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC).

On the basis of the consultations, there was a strong desire on the part of members to bring the matter to closure. It was clear that there was no consensus to change the mandate given to the OPCW team. Accordingly, I concluded, with the concurrence of the members of the Council, that until and unless there was a new consensus to change or modify the mandate of the OPCW team, the mandate remained.

There was consensus that the members of the Council should be furnished by UNSCOM with additional information in response to the questions posed by China and supported by other members, including a full account of the use by UNSCOM of VX reference standards in the chemical laboratory in Baghdad as soon as possible. A list of those questions is attached.

Accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hasmy Agam  
President of the Security Council

His Excellency  
Mr. Kofi Annan  
Secretary-General

*Over* →  
*[Signature]*

LIST OF QUESTIONS POSED BY CHINA, TO WHICH THE RESPONSE OF UNSCOM IS REQUIRED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. The specific time of the third delivery of the last vial of VX to the Lab and the specific composition of VX;
2. The original lab records of each and every calibration in which VX was used, including the number of calibrations conducted, the quantity of VX used and the results of the calibrations, etc;
3. If VX reference standards become invalid within a year, could we take it that the first two deliveries of VX by the UNSCOM are already harmless now? If that is the case, then why do they still have to be cemented?
4. If the first two deliveries of VX were already degraded and invalid, then why have they not been destroyed immediately?
5. If the overall quantity of the seven vials of VX in the Lab is no more than 10mg, less than one lethal dose to harm one standard-sized person (70kg), could we take it then that the VX stored in the Lab does not pose any threat to the safety of the staff of the UN and other organizations living at the Canal Hotel, nor to nearby residents?
6. If analysis on VX reference standards "would not be conclusive and would not solve any concerns" from the scientific point of view, then what is the purpose of the calibrations on Iraqi warheads?
7. If VX reference standards become invalid within a year and the result of each calibration differs due to the different time, venue, environment and UV light of each calibration, then how can we be assured that the results of the calibrations and analysis on Iraqi warheads are valid?
8. If VX becomes invalid within a year, then can the UNSCOM know for sure that Iraq now still possesses chemical weapons of mass destruction with VX? If the answer is yes, then does the UNSCOM have any hard evidence in this regard?

It is hoped that together with the original records, written explanation to the above questions will be produced at the earliest date.