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AUG 24 1999
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Note to Mr. Riza


UNMIK: Repatriation of Bangladeshi and Nepalese contingents

#99-12010-51R



1. Further to the 10 August 1999 letter to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh and the subsequent request that DPKO review all aspects of the situation regarding the repatriation of the Bangladeshi police contingent from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), please find attached a consolidated report, based on information provided by the Police Commissioner of UNMIK, Mr. Sven Frederiksen, on the testing of members of the Bangladeshi and Nepalese contingents.

2. The highlights of the report are as follows:



English test:

- * Although the English test conducted by UNMIK is similar to that administered in UNMIBH, the qualifying mark is 70% rather than 60%. (The original 80% mark was revised by the mission - the results of the Bangladeshi and Nepalese contingents were, therefore, based on the 70% mark.)
- * The establishment of a 70% qualifying mark by UNMIK was based on considerations of minimum conditions of safety and operational necessity in a law enforcement rather than police monitoring mission.
- * The majority of the Bangladeshi contingent passed the English test (42 out of 49). Five officers whose initial scores were close to the 70% mark were offered the chance to retake the test. None of the five passed the second test.

Driving test:

- * The two-part driving test administered by UNMIK is identical to that administered in UNMIBH.
- * All members of the Bangladeshi contingent passed the first part of the driving test (handling test). Thirty-nine of the officers passed the second part of the test, namely the road test. The ten officers who failed the road test were assessed as being unfamiliar with even the most basic operations of driving in traffic.
- * UNMIK does not have the capacity to provide remedial driver training in the mission, nor does it have sufficient personnel to conduct extra training. Therefore,

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the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh is correct in stating that the ten officers who failed the test were not given a re-test (UNMIK has indicated that no members of any other contingent were provided with a re-testing option as implied in the letter from the Permanent Representative).

Weapons handling test:


- * None of the Bangladeshi contingent members were able to demonstrate basic skills, understanding or awareness of how to handle weapons. They could not load the weapons or the magazine clips and did not know in which direction the ammunition was to be inserted. They also had no knowledge of how to disassemble or reassemble weapons.
- * Weapons handling tests were cancelled due to serious safety concerns (several of the testers were nearly injured by the accidental discharge of weapons by members of the Bangladeshi contingent).
- * Intensive training was provided by UNMIK to the Bangladeshis in order to improve their skills. Only 13 members of the contingent were eventually able to pass the weapons handling test.

3. It is clear from UNMIK's report that the major difficulty experienced by the Bangladeshi contingent was in the area of weapons handling. The Permanent Representative, in his letter to the Secretary-General, has stated that there was no prior notice given by DPKO regarding a shooting test in the mission. Although it is possible that member States were not informed that their officers would be tested on arrival, we are firmly of the view that since all member States were aware that these officers were expected to be armed, knowledge of how to handle a weapon was a basic requirement that they were expected to meet. We fully concur with UNMIK that it is not the responsibility of the mission to train police officers in the basic use and handling of firearms but that this is a skill that all police officers must bring with them and expect to be tested on.

4. With regard to the Nepalese contingent, it appears that although DPKO had clearly and unequivocally informed member States, during a police contributors meeting on 2 July 1999, that UNMIK was to be an armed law enforcement mission, this information may not have reached Kathmandu. In any event, on 5 August 1999, the Nepalese contingent commander told the UNMIK Police Commissioner that he had been informed by his authorities that "the Nepal contingent would not participate in the mission because of its nature as a law enforcement rather than a monitoring mission." Appropriate arrangements were made therefore to repatriate the full contingent.

5. The repatriation of the majority of the Bangladeshi and of the entire Nepalese contingents was clearly an unfortunate incident. We are, however, pleased to note that Bangladesh has now agreed to the transfer to UNMIBH of six of its officers who passed tests conducted by an IPTF evaluation team in Skopje (the Nepalese declined to allow four of their officers to be transferred). In addition, Bangladesh has requested DPKO to dispatch a Selection Assistance Team to Dhaka in order to help identify officers suitable for UNMIK. We have requested UNMIK to take action on this matter.

6. Given the continuing uncertainty regarding the requirements for UNMIK police officers, we have requested that the Police Commissioner or his Deputy travel to New York this week in order that we may discuss and finalise this matter and inform police contributors accordingly. We would be grateful for your support on this as UNMIK has not, so far, agreed to send a police representative to New York.

for 
Bernard Miyet
23 August 1999

cc: The Deputy Secretary-General

Executive Office of the Secretary-General
Cabinet du Secrétaire général

[Handwritten signature]
22/1/16

I think I sent a note to BM on HA with some questions that remain unanswered. For example, how clearly were CIPPEC requirements communicated to potential contributors.

While handling HA for the note attached, please remind DMO of outstanding questions. (My note in Central on form Sita.)

Done. HA noted SIR's concerns. But called attention to para 4, page 2. *[Signature]*
S. I. Riza
25/1/16